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Pension reform is one of the top public policy priorities in advanced industrialized countries due to 
population ageing and the significant weight of pension spending in governments’ budgets. As a 
result of these concerns European countries have engaged in varying degrees of pension reforms over 
the last three decades. The extant literature on pension reform focuses on structural, institutional and 
blame avoidance theories to explain how pension reform take place. Yet, how do different conditions 
combine to lead to significant pension reform outcomes? To answer this question we analyze a set of 
48 pension reform cases in eight European countries since the late 1980s up until 2014 by using fuzzy 
set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA). Our main finding is that institutional, structural or 
blame avoidance theories cannot account by themselves for instances of significant pension reform 
Rather, we find three pathways that combine structural and institutional conditions to lead to 
significant pension reform. 
Introduction 
Pension reforms implemented since the early 1990s have been far from uniform in terms of 
their content and direction and have attracted scholarly attention on the ways in which 
different socio-economic, institutional and other factors affect reform processes and 
outcomes. While Bismarckian pension systems have been described as "frozen landscapes” 
(Esping-Andersen 1990), a term used to denote their inertia, studies have shown “elephants to 
be on the move” (Hinrichs 2000). In Italy, for example, socio-economic conditions, the EMU 
process through its impact on debt and deficit levels, concertation with the social partners and 
changes in the political landscape have combined during the 1990s to open a window of 
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opportunity, absent until that point, that allowed the introduction of path-departing pension 
reform through the adoption of a notional defined contribution system1 (Natali 2004). By 
contrast, Greece has been unable to introduce significant pension reforms as institutional 
legacies have proven far stronger than the EU pressure for change, leading to path-dependent 
reforms (Sotiropoulos 2004).  
 
In the case of pension systems in central and eastern European countries Müller (1999) has 
shown how reform outcomes have varied as a result of the differences in the structural setting 
and the constellations and interactions of relevant political actors. For example, in Hungary, 
the economic pressures (rise in unemployment and inflation) that arose during the transition 
from state socialism to market economy combined with institutional factors allowed the 
carving-out of a second mandatory pension pillar between 1998 and 2004 (Müller 1999). 
Following the 2008 crisis, the need to reduce pressure on finances and the European 
Commission’s negative response to the Hungarian and other European countries’ request to 
exclude transition costs of pension privatization from debt and deficit accounts, along with 
favorable institutional factors, led to the elimination of the second pillar (Simonovits 2011). 
Other EU countries subject to adjustment programmes, such as Portugal, Greece, Cyprus, and 
Ireland, have witnessed during the crisis the increase of EU intrusiveness in welfare state 
reform  (Theodoropoulou 2014).  
 
Motivated by the fact that significant pension reforms are potentially complex and result from 
the combination of different causes, we explore the conditions that must be present for 
                                                     
1 Notional defined contribution (NDC) systems mimic a funded system of individual accounts, yet 
with a PAYG financing structure (where workers pay contributions that are used to finance current 
pensioners). In NDC systems contributions are tracked in accounts which earn a rate of return which 
is set by the government and is not the product of investment return as accounts are notional. Upon 
reaching pension age, accumulated contributions and notional returns are converted into an 
annuity.  
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significant pension reforms to occur. Our specific focus is on the impact of reforms on the 
architecture of the retirement system as a whole (Hinrichs and Kangas 2003). Thus, 
“significant pension reform” (SPR) is defined in this paper as a reform entailing the 
introduction or elimination of a mandatory second pillar of private pension accounts that 
results in what Hall (1993) terms “paradigmatic change”. Using fuzzy-set Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) we show that significant pension reform is the result of three 
different pathways that combine significant unemployment with either the absence of 
legislative fragmentation, significant government deficit levels or a strong labor movement. 
  
Through the analysis of pension reforms using fsQCA, we aim to contribute to the literature 
on the methods and approaches that can be used for the study of welfare state and pension 
politics while also acknowledging some of its limitations. Furthermore, we aim to show how 
our findings may challenge or, at least complement, some of the assumptions of well-
established theories.  
 
The Politics of Pension Reform 
Welfare state (and pension) reforms since the mid 1980s have sparked the attention of 
scholars and have led to a vast literature seeking to explain the mechanisms and content of 
such reforms. In terms of reform content, while initial attention focused on retrenchment 
(Pierson 1994, 1996) a more refined approach highlighted three dimensions of welfare 
restructuring: cost-containment, recalibration and recommodification (Pierson 2001). While 
cost-containment is associated with cutbacks, recalibration entails updating “to adapt to 
changing norms and demands” and/or rationalization (“modification of programmes in line 
with new ideas about achieving established goals”). By contrast,  recommodification focuses 
on enhancing active labor force participation. According to Pierson (2001) each welfare 
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regime follows a different route in the face of intense pressures for austerity. The liberal 
focuses on cost-containment and recommodification, the social democratic on cost-
containment and recalibration (rationalization) and the conservative on cost-containment and 
recalibration (updating of old programmes).  
 
Social policy scholars have also used Hall’s framework to assess the degree of innovation 
introduced in specific reforms and thus the extent at which reforms affect the instruments 
and/or the overall logic of the system. The proposed framework distinguishes between three 
types of changes (Hall 1993). The first type involves changes in the setting of instruments 
(such as an increase in social contributions or a decrease of benefit levels). The second type 
entails the introduction of new instruments, such as new rules for the calculation of benefits, 
while the third type (paradigmatic changes) involves the introduction of new goals. As 
pointed out by several scholars (Bonoli and Palier 2007, Hinrichs and Kangas 2003) path-
dependent changes (such as second types ones) may nonetheless lead to a paradigm shift as 
their effects take years to materialize.  
 
Turning to the factors driving pension reforms, the neo-functionalist approach highlights 
socio-economic factors like deepening economic integration, demographic pressures, and 
unemployment. Yet, while all Western European countries are faced with significant 
demographic changes, these have not translated in similar reform outcomes (cf. cases of Italy 
and Greece cited in the introduction). The pressure on the financing of public pension 
systems as a result of the industrial reconversion and the rise of unemployment has led Huber 
and Stephens (2001) to argue that unemployment is a stronger explanatory factor of welfare 
and pension reform compared to demographic change. But as their impact on the timing and 
extent of reforms is still debated, socio-economic changes are seen more as the triggers of 
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reform processes in turn mediated by political-institutional factors (Rodrik, 1996; Starke, 
2006). In his seminal work, Paul Pierson (1998, 2001) showed how changes in the global 
economy, population ageing and the expansion of welfare states (what he terms “irresistible 
forces”) meet with the “immovable objects” (the popular support of programmes and 
institutional stickiness related to veto points within formal institutions and path-dependent 
processes) to put severe obstacles to the dismantling of the welfare state. Pierson showed that 
reform is possible in such context through a strategy based on compromise and leading to the 
restructuring (rather than dismantling) and modernization of the welfare state. To avoid 
blame for unpopular policies, policymakers may resort to compensation and obfuscation 
strategies. For example, Bonoli and Palier (2007) highlighted the importance of sequencing 
such as the introduction of long-phasing in periods and the gradual shift towards funding. 
 
Focusing on the role of institutions Bonoli (2000) explains that institutional settings that 
provide power concentration to the executive and fewer veto points for opponents facilitate 
reforms. However, he points out that the impact of political institutions is mediated by 
electoral results and the mobilization of strong societal groups like labor unions. Readapting 
the institutional approach, Immergut et al. (2007) explain the adoption of pension reforms 
despite the existence of a significant number of veto players by reference to political 
competition. When the latter is intense (because for example the electoral system provides 
ways for voters potentially affected by the reform to vote against the government), policy 
makers will either seek consensus for the proposed measures or withdraw them.  
 
For scholars studying the role of institutions, the structure of the pension system is an equally 
important aspect in shaping reform outcomes. The crowding-in thesis postulates that mature 
Bismarckian pension systems leave little room for the development of private occupational 
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pensions as they provide sufficient earnings-related benefits. At the same time, social 
partners are already involved in pension systems’ administration and as such not interested in 
setting additional pension schemes. By contrast, Beveridge basic pension type systems are 
expected to provide more room for the introduction of occupational pensions (Hinrichs 2000, 
Myles and Pierson 2001). As more recent analyses have shown, reform of public pension 
systems has been facilitated by the introduction of occupational pensions in Bismarckian 
systems (Ebbinghaus 2011). In the case of mature multi-pillar systems as those of the UK and 
the Netherlands, changes have been described as “path-dependent incremental adaptations to 
the changing socio-economic environment” (Ebbinghaus 2011).  
 
The power resources theory has in turn placed focus on the role of class struggle and political 
mobilization, usually led by strong labor unions, in the expansion of the welfare state, 
(O'Connor and Olsen 1998). As rightly pointed out though, the emergence and maturation of 
welfare states has created at the same time groups benefiting from them such as pensioners, 
in addition to those associated with its expansion like political parties and workers’ 
movements. As Pierson (1996) puts it “maturing social programs develop new bases of 
organized support that have substantial autonomy from the labor movement”. While Pierson 
highlights the emergence of new beneficiaries, like the American Association of Retired 
Persons, to support the decline of the role of trade unions, this does not seem to be the case in 
Continental Europe. On the contrary, trade unions in European countries have played an 
important role in negotiated reforms (social pacts) in advancing unpopular reforms through a 
trade-off strategy (Ebbingaus 2011, Natali and Rhodes 2007). Gelepithis (2018) study on the 
ways of achieving more encompassing private pensions argued that unions’ demands can 
come about through different pathways: collective self-regulation and top-down regulation in 
Continental Europe; top-down regulation in Anglophone countries. Korpi and Palme (2003) 
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have shown that partisan politics still matters in understanding welfare reform in the context 
of austerity. In this context, Green Pedersen (2003) showed in his study on welfare reforms in 
Denmark and the Netherlands how party politics affected the establishment of broad political 
agreement on socioeconomic policy that also encompassed welfare state reforms.  
 
Abou-Chadi and Immergut (2018) examine electoral competition stressing that welfare state 
politics now involve trade-offs between “new” versus “old” social rights (or social 
investment versus social consumption). Studying 10 OECD countries between 1980 to 2011 
the authors find that when electoral competition intensifies left governments are willing to 
prioritize social investment to the expense of pension right generosity to be able to expand 
programmes for new social risks. Meanwhile centre-right governments avoid retrenchment 
on pension rights and pension expenditure. The emphasis on electoral competition allows the 
authors to show how parties can depart from their traditional policy positions depending on 
the degree of competition.  
 
The recent crisis has also revived the interest on the role of international organizations in the 
pension reform process. Orenstein (2005, 2011) showed the role of international 
organizations (primarily the World Bank’s) in the diffusion of pension privatization ideas 
worldwide starting in the 1990s. Other scholars (Beland 2009, Schmidt 2003, Schmidt and 
Radaelli 2004) stressed the role of ideas in the construction of the issues and problems that 
enter the policy agenda, by shaping the economic and social assumptions that legitimize or 
challenge existing institutions and policies. Yet the influence of ideas is at most indirect in 
shaping national reform processes. Following the 2008 crisis, EU countries that required 
financial assistance, have witnessed an increase of international actors’ intrusiveness. Yet, 
related studies have shown that the degree of intrusiveness has been far from uniform (Hick 
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2017, Theodoropoulou 2014). For the rest of the EU countries the need to abide to the new 
economic governance framework puts further pressure on member states and prohibits 
reforms with a negative impact on debt and deficit levels.  
 
To sum up, there seem to be three broad hypotheses on pension reform coming out from 
theoretical approaches that have focused on structural factors, class struggles and institutions: 
 H1: Following the analyses on structural and socio-economic conditions, significant 
pension reforms are expected in situations in which a country faces negative socio-economic 
conditions such as high unemployment and weak government finances. 
 H2: The expectation of the institutional analyses is that a strong government and a 
weak labor movement should make significant pension reforms more likely. This also aligns 
with the expectation of the power resource theory. 
 H3: By contrast, the literature on the "new politics of the welfare state" expects 
significant pension reforms to be easier in settings where there is a weak government and a 
weak labor movement as it could be easier to "hide" and "distribute" the blame for cost-
cutting significant pension reform.  
  
The above review on welfare and pension reform suggests that pension reform processes are 
complex phenomena affected by the interaction of socio-economic, institutional, and political 
mobilization conditions. Significant pension reform is expected to be met in different ways as 
a result of the different socio-economic and institutional context in which they take place and 
in which party politics may differ. So far, comparative studies have been good in describing 
how different conditions may combine to explain significant reform. Nonetheless these 
analyses tend to be highly descriptive and focused on few cases. Against this background, we 
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aim to account for the possible multiple causes that may combine in different ways to explain 
pension reform in a more systematic way.  
 
Research Design, Method and Data 
As pension reforms are complex phenomena and as such are expected to be met in different 
ways, we analyze them using Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis. Fuzzy set 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) has been proposed by many scholars in public 
policy analysis as an alternative to case-oriented and quantitative regression-based 
approaches, as it can handle research designs with a relatively small number of observations 
while still providing parsimonious results and acknowledging the complexity of each case 
(Rihoux and Ragin 2009). Critically for our research, fsQCA assumes cases as combinations 
of different values for the outcome of interest and the causal conditions.  fsQCA can also 
account for causal complexity, which is given by the fact that a combination of different 
causes may lead to an outcome of interest (Ragin, 2000, Ragin, 2008, Rihoux & Ragin, 
2009). Furthermore, fsQCA can account for equifinality, i.e. a situation in which an outcome 
may follow from different combinations of causal conditions, that is, from different causal 
“recipes” (Ragin 2008, p.23). Causal complexity and equifinality are important aspects to be 
considered when comparing cases of pension reforms as it has been shown that they are 
likely to be the result of complex combinations of conditions (Gelepithis 2018). Yet, as 
pointed out by Rihoux and Ragin (2008), fsQCA does not make a statement on the causal 
process but rather on the causes or combination of them that must be present for an outcome 
to occur. It is then up to the investigator to use substantive knowledge on each case to 
identify the causal mechanism at play. 
 
In contrast to quantitative regression-based techniques, fsQCA is grounded in set theory. 
Cases are understood as combinations of different set theoretic values for the outcome of 
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interest and for the causal conditions. The outcome to be explained and the different causal 
conditions are assumed to range from no membership to full membership in a given set 
condition. Full membership is denoted by a value of 1 and no membership with a value of 0. 
Partial membership in a set condition are given values between 1 and 0. Membership scores 
greater than 0.5 indicate that a case is “more in than out” in the set condition, scores close to 
1 indicate that a case is “mostly in” a set condition, scores close to 0 indicate that a case is 
“mostly out”, and so on. Full membership (1) and full non-membership (0) are understood as 
qualitative states, not arbitrary values (i.e., the highest and lowest observed scores). Thus, the 
calibration of membership in a fuzzy set involves both quantitative and qualitative 
assessments and must be grounded in theoretical and substantive knowledge of the cases 
being analyzed (Ragin 2008). 
 
Once the researcher has coded all the cases as combination of values for the outcome and the 
causal conditions, they can be analyzed using the fsQCA software. fsQCA identifies 
necessary and sufficient conditions by using the concepts of sets and subsets. A necessary 
condition represents a condition that, if the outcome of interest is present, the condition must 
also be present. Thus, if a condition is necessary, it implies that it contains the outcome of 
interest (the outcome is a subset of the cause). If a condition (or combination of conditions) is 
sufficient, it means that the condition must be present for the outcome to take place. In this 
case, the outcome contains the cause (the cause is a subset of the outcome). fsQCA accounts 
for the complexity of social phenomena by identifying the different necessary conditions and 
the combination of different causes that may be sufficient to observe an outcome of interest 
(Ragin 2008).  
 
Cases, outcome and calibration 
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We look at 48 instances of pension reform in eight European countries (Greece, Germany, 
Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Sweden and the United Kingdom) between 
1986 and 2014. From a comparative point of view the countries under study are all broadly 
similar in that they are all advanced industrialized and in Europe. At the same time, they 
belong to different “worlds of welfare capitalism” (Esping-Andersen 1990). More 
importantly, the eight countries have implemented reforms over this period that have ranged 
from parametric ones, where parameters of the system are changed such as the benefit 
indexation mechanism or the retirement age, to paradigmatic ones entailing the introduction 
or elimination of a mandatory second pillar of private accounts, resulting in a change of the 
system architecture (Immergut et al 2007). Thus, understanding the causal complexity behind 
instances of pension reform can yield interesting insights to understand pension reforms in 
other industrialized countries.  
 
Each case is composed of a specific fuzzy set value for the outcome and the causal conditions 
outlined further below, which are based on the theoretical expectations analyzed in the 
previous section. The total number of cases is 48, which provides a good degree of analytical 
leverage given the variation in the casual conditions.   
 
The outcome of interest is defined as significant pension reform (SPR). The extant literature 
on pension reform has distinguished between parametric and paradigmatic / structural 
reforms (Bonoli and Palier 2008, Hll 1993, Hinrichs and Kanfas 2003, Myles and Pierson 
2001; Brooks 2009; Immergut et al 2007). Parametric reforms typically include changes such 
as the retirement age or the benefit indexation formula. By contrast structural reforms may 
include a change in the architecture of the system through the introduction of new goals such 
as in our case the introduction or removal of an existing pillar. 
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We build on this categorization to define and calibrate SPR. Namely, we define significant 
pension reform (SPR) as one that changes the architecture of the current system (Hinrichs 
and Kangas 2003) so that the components of retirement income are altered altogether, via the 
introduction or elimination of a mandatory private pillar. Thus, the cut-off for determining 
full membership in the set of significant pension reform is given by whether a reform entails 
the introduction or the elimination of a mandatory private pillar. These cases are given a 
fuzzy set value of 1. The cut-off for non-membership in this set is given by whether a reform 
entails only administrative changes or benefit indexation changes. These cases are given a 
fuzzy set value of 0.  
  
To further construct the remaining fuzzy set values for SPR we consider key policy 
components of pension reforms that may be subject to change. These include changes to: 
retirement age, minimum contribution levels and the funding principle. Table A1 in the annex 
summarizes the full fuzzy set calibration for the outcome. As can be seen, we do not include 
a 0.5 membership, which would be neither in nor outside of the set of significant pension 
reform. This is because, as indicated by the literature, we believe that pension reforms will 
always either tend to be of a structural or parametric nature. In fuzzy set terms, reforms with 
a structural tendency will be "mostly in the set" (0.75) or "in the set" (1) of significant 
pension reform. These cases will include instances of reforms that introduce or eliminate a 
mandatory pillar (which receive a fuzzy set value of 1) or instances of reforms that change 
the funding principle of the first public pillar (as in Italy in 1995) or aim to increase 
participation in a non-mandatory private pillar, for example via automatic enrolment as in the 
UK since 2008 (which receive a fuzzy set value of 0.75). The underlying logic to calibrating 
these reforms as “mostly significant” is that the composition of income in retirement is likely 
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to be altered to a large extent, even if a new mandatory pillar is not introduced or eliminated. 
For example, in Italy future pensioners will have their pension benefit from the public pillar 
calculated in a new way that is likely to result in less adequate pensions than under previous 
rules (Natali and Rhodes 2007). In the UK the proportion of retirement income from private 
pensions for future pensioners will increase to a large extent as a result of automatic 
enrolment and low opt-out rates (PPI 2014). Parametric reforms will be mostly out (0.25) or 
definitely out of the set of significant reform (0). These will include cases of reforms that 
increase the retirement age or contribution levels (0.25) or instances of reforms that include 
administrative changes or changes to benefit indexation (0). 
 
Causal conditions 
We have selected causal conditions that take into consideration key institutional and 
structural socio-economic factors highlighted in the literature. Regarding institutional factors, 
scholars agree that the strength of key veto players in pension reforms such as the 
government and the labor movement may affect pension reform outcomes. Therefore, we 
have built two causal conditions: strong labor movement (SL) and significant legislative 
fragmentation (LF). To capture the expectations from structuralist and neo-functionalist 
analysis we have built two other causal conditions: significant unemployment (SU) and 
significant government deficit (GD). The coding and calibration of these four causal 
conditions are explained in the annex.  
 
Analysis 
The fsQCA software (http://www.compasss.org) is used to find out the conditions or 
combination thereof that are sufficient for the outcome to occur, i.e. conditions that must be 
present for the outcome to occur. This analysis involves two steps. In the ﬁrst step, a ‘truth 
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table algorithm’ (Ragin 2005) is used to transform the fuzzy-set membership scores for each 
case into a truth table. This algorithm uses the direct link between the rows of the truth table 
and the corners of the property space, whereby the latter is the multidimensional space 
consisting of the logically possible combinations of causal conditions. If there are k 
conditions, the property space has 2k corners. In this article, the property space has 24 (= 16) 
corners. 
 
In the second stage, the researcher examines the distribution of cases across the corners of the 
property space (the resulting rows of the truth table) and establishes the degree to which 
membership in a corner is a subset of the outcome – that is, to what extent a case’s placement 
in a speciﬁc combination of conditions is sufficient for the outcome (significant pension 
reform) to occur (see Ragin 2006: 96). Table 1 Shows the resulting truth table. 
 
Table 1 here 
 
In this phase, the researcher must look at the "Number" column, which indicates how many 
cases accord to a specific combination. The researcher must then set a frequency threshold. 
The present analysis uses a frequency threshold of 1. Combinations with 0 number of cases 
are discarded. Subsequently the researcher must look at the consistency column and decide 
on a threshold to set out which combinations are a subset of the outcome (sufficient) and thus 
will receive a value of 1 in the outcome column. Consistency ranges from 0 to 1 and it 
measures the degree to which a causal combination is a subset of the outcome (sufficient) 
(Rihoux and Ragin, 2009). In general consistency values below 0.8 denote high inconsistency 
(Rihoux and Ragin, 2009, p. 118). Thus, we choose a consistency cut-off of 0.8 for our 
analysis. 
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As a result of this step the software will simplify, using Boolean algebra, the combinations 
that are a subset of the outcome and produce a simplified solution with a number of 
combinations or "routes" for our outcome of interest. The software produces a complex, 
parsimonious and intermediate solution. In our analysis we use only the complex solution as 
it is the only one that does not make simplifying assumptions. Simplifying assumptions are 
statements about the hypothetical outcome of the logical remainders, which are the 
combinations that may be possible but for which there are no cases. Table 2 reports the 
fs/QCA software solution: 
 
Table 2 here 
 
The fsQCA analysis provides values of consistency and coverage for each term of the 
solution and for the solution as a whole. The fsQCA output also produces an estimate of 
coverage. Coverage indicates the proportion of membership in the outcome explained by the 
whole solution or by each term of the solution. As such, the coverage coefficient bears some 
resemblance to the R2 (coefficient of determination) in regression analysis. The overall 
coverage of our model is over 0.65, which indicates that more than 65 percent of instances of 
the outcome are explained by the four combinations identified in the solution. The software 
also provides a coverage value for each combination, which includes raw and unique 
coverage. Raw coverage measures the proportion of memberships in the outcome explained 
by each term of the solution. Unique coverage measures the proportion of memberships in the 
outcome explained solely by each individual solution term (memberships that are not covered 
by other solution terms). Thus, unique coverage is always lower than raw coverage as it is a 
much restrictive measure. 
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The results indicate that significant unemployment is a necessary condition, as it features in 
all three combinations of causes. Thus, all instances of significant pension reform feature 
significant unemployment. This lends some support to the literature that focuses on structural 
socio-economic conditions to explain significant economic and pension reform and argues 
that unemployment features prominently in instances of pension reform (Huber and Stephens 
2001). The results also indicate that unemployment by itself does not lead to significant 
pension reform as it must be combined with other causal conditions to be sufficient for 
significant pension reform to occur.  
 
Overall, the results indicate that significant pension reform is a complex phenomenon as it is 
present when conditions combine in different ways. The fact that unemployment must be 
combined with other conditions to lead to significant pension reform illustrates the concept of 
multiple conjunctural causation. The results also illustrate the concept of equifinality as there 
are three different solutions or "routes" that lead to significant pension reform. 
 
The first solution indicates that unemployment must be combined with the absence of 
legislative fragmentation to lead to significant pension reform. This provides some support to 
institutional "veto player" analyses that argue that a less fragmented political system may be 
more conducive to significant reform (Natali 2004; Orenstein 2000). Yet it also illustrates 
that a strong government will be compelled to introduce a significant reform if facing a 
deteriorating structural economic situation marked by persistently high unemployment levels. 
This corroborates some scholars' views that socio-economic changes can act as triggers to 
structural reforms but tend to be mediated by institutional conditions (Rodrik 1996; Starke 
2006). The second solution illustrates the "structural economic" route to pension reform more 
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clearly, as it combines significant unemployment with high government deficit levels. 
Finally, the third route illustrates that governments are successful in introducing significant 
pension reform when facing a strong labor movement and a deteriorating economic situation 
marked by high unemployment. This seems to contradict the assumptions of the power 
resource theory, which argued that a strong labor movement will typically resist structural 
reforms. Yet, when combined with a deteriorating structural economic situation, a strong 
labor movement may be instrumental in supporting significant reform in exchange of specific 
concessions (Natali and Rhodes 2007). 
  
How well do the three combinations identified in this analysis cover the cases of significant 
pension reform? To illustrate this Table 3 below shows the fuzzy scores for the outcome and 
the three casual combinations for each case.  
 
Table 3 here 
 
Instances of the outcome (values over 0.5, indicating reforms that are mostly significant or 
significant) are marked in bold in the first column.2 Solutions that are a subset of the outcome 
(sufficient) are equal or less than the value of the outcome are also marked in bold. However, 
it should be noted that a high difference between the value of the outcome and a given 
sufficient causal combination denotes high inconsistency (Ochel and Rohwer 2009, 23; Ragin 
2006).  
 
In the case of the Hungarian reform of 1997 that introduced a new mandatory private pillar, 
we observe that this is explained by the combination of high unemployment and the absence 
                                                     
2 This approach to interpreting the results is consistent with other fsQCA analyses; see for 
example Vis (2009) 
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of legislative fragmentation. This is consistent with analyses that have pointed out how, in the 
context of high unemployment in the 1990s as a result of the transition from state socialism 
to capitalism, the strong government led by Fidesz (which had a near majority in Parliament 
itself) and allies, pushed for the reform as part of the package of market-oriented reforms 
(Müller 1999). 
 
In 14 out of 20 instances of the outcome we identify more than one combination as sufficient, 
meaning that the outcome can be explained by more than one combination. Using substantive 
knowledge, we can identify the combination of causal conditions that is more relevant for 
each case. In the case of the Hungarian reform of 2011, which eliminated the private pillar 
introduced in 1997, both the combination of significant unemployment with either the lack of 
legislative fragmentation or high government deficit levels are sufficient to explain this 
reform. While the absolute majority enjoyed by Fidesz in Parliament cannot be disregarded, 
scholars have pointed out how the need to reduce pressure on finances coupled with the 
European Commission’s negative response to Hungarian and other European governments' 
request to exclude the transition costs of pension privatization from debt and deficit accounts 
led the government to eliminate the private pillar and switch those funds to the Treasury as a 
"quick fix" to improve its financial position (Simonovits 2011; Datz and Dancsi 2013). Thus 
the combination of significant unemployment and government deficit seems to better apply to 
this case.  
 
In the case of the Greek pension reform of 2010, which changed the funding principle of the 
first public pillar by introducing a sustainability factor, the combination of unemployment 
with either the lack legislative fragmentation or the existence of a strong labor movement are 
sufficient to lead to this outcome. A closer look at this case shows that majoritarian electoral 
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rules, which provide a 50 seat bonus to the first party, played a significant role in securing 
Government’s support in Parliament. This is consistent with analyses of this reform that 
showed that there was not much resistance in Parliament to support this package (Gemenis 
and Nezi 2015). 
 
The Italian pension reform of 1995 changed the benefit calculation of the first pillar by 
introducing a system of notional accounts where contributions will still be used to pay current 
pensioners; however, the benefit will now be calculated based on the amount of contributions 
made while working and life expectancy at retirement, among other conditions. The results 
show that the combination of significant unemployment with either government deficit or a 
strong labor movement is sufficient to explain this outcome. Yet, previous analyses have 
shown that negotiation with the strong labor movement (whose protests led to the resignation 
of the previous Berlusconi government) was key to reach a consensus for this reform. This 
was facilitated through specific concessions for the labor movement regarding the 
administration of the system and the exclusion of older workers from the reform (Natali and 
Rhodes 2007).  
 
The results in Table 3 also highlight that a combination of causes may be sufficient but 
highly inconsistent. For example, the UK reform of 2008 that introduced automatic 
enrolment into private pensions could be explained by any of the three causal combinations. 
However, there is maximum difference between the value of the outcome and the value of 
each causal combination, which denotes high inconsistency.  Similarly, in the case of the 
Swedish reform of 1994 that introduced a mandatory private pillar all the three combinations 
are sufficient. We conclude that other combinations of causes not captured in this study may 
better explain this reform. 
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Discussion and Conclusions 
Pension reforms have attracted scholarly attention and have produced a vast literature based 
on different theories (new politics of the welfare state, power resources, structural-
neofunctionalism) that has identified the factors that may be linked to significant reform. The 
related literature has also hinted that pension reform processes are complex and may be the 
result of the combination of different factors (Natali 2004; Anderson and Immergut 2007; 
Hinrichs 2005). Yet, such analyses have tended to focus on a small number of cases and their 
explanations are complex. 
 
We have used fsQCA to find out more systematic explanations on the specific combination 
of causes that may lead to significant pension reform. Our results show three pathways : 1) 
the presence of significant unemployment combined with the absence of significant 
legislative fragmentation, 2) the presence of significant unemployment with significant 
government deficit levels and 3) the presence of significant unemployment with the presence 
of a strong labor movement.  
 
Our analysis indicates that while structural socio-economic conditions (such as 
unemployment) may act as triggers, they need to be combined with other specific factors in 
order to lead to significant pension reform. Certainly, this case has been made before (Rodrik 
1996; Starke 2006). Yet, the specific combinations of conditions found in our analysis seem 
to challenge or, at least complement, some of the assumptions of the main theories on 
pension reform processes. For example, according to the power resource theory only a weak 
labor movement would allow the introduction of significant pension reform. As our analysis 
has shown, facing significant high unemployment levels, a strong labor movement may 
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consider lending support to the introduction of paradigmatic changes. This could be as part of 
a trade-off strategy. The reform adopted in Italy in 1995 (mostly signficant according to our 
analysis) is a good example: the change in the funding principle of the first pillar from 
defined benefit to notional defined contribution has been made possible through a trade-off 
strategy between the government and trade unions, with the latter obtaining concessions such 
as a long phase-in period of the new system so as to protect older workers, on whose support 
they mainly rely (Natali and Rhodes 2004).  
 
Furthermore, the finding that unemployment must be combined with the absence of 
legislative fragmentation, puts into question some of the assumptions of the New Politics of 
the Welfare state literature, which argued that weak governments may be more successful at 
passing significant reforms by hiding the blame for their costs. By contrast, our finding seems 
to indicate that, facing high unemployment levels, strong governments may have it easier to 
justify significant reforms. This is illustrated by the case of Hungary in 1997, where a fairly 
strong government introduced a mandatory private pillar as part of the package of market-
oriented reforms designed to develop capital markets and address stagnant economic growth 
and high unemployment in the 1990s. In this way, this finding complements the insights of 
the "veto player" perspective (Tsebelis 2002) which expects strong governments to be able to 
pass significant reforms  
 
Finally, the expectations of structural economic theories are further complemented by our 
finding that the  combination of significant high unemployment and government deficit levels 
leads to significant pension reforms. The elimination of the private pillar in Hungary in 2011 
illustrates this finding, albeit we acknowledge that we arrive to this conclusion by using 
substantive knowledge on this case All in all, we acknowledge the limitations in our analysis 
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so further qualitative and quantitative research would be necessary to explore the extent to 
which the assumptions of well established theories can be challenged and complemented to 
better understand instances of significant pension reform. 
 
Accounting for multiple conjunctural causation has been a significant motivation for this 
analysis. Indeed, our analysis has shown that pension reform is the result of the combination 
of different causes. However, fsQCA is just one method by which we can gain a better 
understanding of how different causal conditions may combine to explain complex social 
phenomena. Furthermore, fsQCA is not without its limitations, most notably how to 
consistently calibrate a complex outcome and a set of causal conditions consistently. Using 
cases' substantive knowledge is key to address this major concern. We have also shown that 
fsQCA is not a deterministic method (Schneider and Wagemann (2012, 316). With the 
introduction of parameters of fit such as consistency, we have shown that while solutions 
may be sufficient, they may not be consistent. This may mean that further qualitative research 
is needed to understand cases covered by inconsistent sufficient combinations. As we 
discussed in the case of the significant Swedish 1994 reform and the (mostly significant) UK 
2008 pension reforms, all three solutions, while sufficient, are highly inconsistent, thus they 
cannot properly account for those cases . 
 
Overall, our analysis shows that pension reform is a complex phenomenon. This is consistent 
with other empirical studies which have found that welfare reforms are explained by the 
combination of specific conditions (Vis 2009; Gelepithis 2018). As such, our analysis 
provides support and evidence on the insights of other scholars who advanced the need to 
consider the combination of different conditions to explain episodes of significant pension 
reform (Natali 2004; Anderson and Immergut 2007; Hinrichs 2005). We conclude that future 
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pension reform research could  gain from the insights of our analysis while also considering 
the limitations of fsQCA and the ways in which these can be addressed.  
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Table 1: Truth Table 
Causal conditions  
LF GD SU SL 
Outcome 
SPR N Consistency 
0 0 1 0 1 1 0.94 
1 1 1 0 1 1 0.93 
0 0 1 1 1 1 0.88 
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1 0 1 1 1 3 0.87 
1 1 1 1 1 2 0.84 
0 1 1 0 1 2 0.83 
0 1 1 1 1 3 0.82 
1 1 0 1 0 3 0.75 
0 0 0 0 0 4 0.74 
0 1 0 0 0 4 0.62 
0 1 0 1 0 4 0.55 
1 0 0 1 0 13 0.47 
1 0 0 0 0 6 0.41 
0 0 0 1 - 0  
1 0 1 0 - 0  
1 1 0 0 - 0  
 
 
Table 2: fsQCA solution 
 Raw  
Coverage 
Unique 
Coverage 
Consistency 
UN* ~LF 0.459 0.038 0.837 
UN*GD 0.437 0.025 0.756 
UN*SL 0.500 0.088 0.816 
solution coverage: 0.658   
solution consistency: 0.789 
 
Table 3: Membership scores of cases 
CASE Outcome: SPR UN* ~LF UN*GD UN*SL 
GR1990 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
GR1991 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
GR1992 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
GR1999 0 1 0.75 1 
GR2002 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 
GR2008 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
GR2010 0.75 0.75 1 0.75 
GR2011 0.25 0.75 1 0.25 
GR2012 0.75 0 1 0.25 
ITA92 0.75 0 0.25 0.25 
ITA95 0.75 0 0.75 0.75 
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CASE Outcome: SPR UN* ~LF UN*GD UN*SL 
ITA97 0.25 0 0.75 0.75 
ITA04 0.75 0 0.25 0.25 
ITA09 0.25 0.25 0 0.25 
ITA10 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
ITA11 0.75 0.25 0.25 0.25 
HU97 1 0.5 0.25 0.25 
HU10 0.75 0.75 0.25 0 
HU11 1 0.75 0.75 0 
SWE92 0 0 0 0 
SWE94 1 0.25 0.25 0.25 
SWE98 0.25 0.25 0 0.25 
SWE01 0 0 0 0 
GER97 0.75 0.25 0.25 0.75 
GER98 0.75 0.25 0 0.75 
GER01 0.75 0.25 0 0.25 
GER04 0.75 0.25 0.25 0.75 
GER07 0.25 0 0 0.25 
GER09 0 0 0 0.25 
SWZ94 0 0 0 0 
SWZ95 0.25 0 0 0 
SWZ03 0.25 0 0 0 
SWZ10 0 0 0 0 
NL87 0 0.25 0.25 0.25 
NL92 0 0 0 0 
NL94 0.75 0.25 0 0.25 
NL97 0 0 0 0.25 
NL04 0.25 0 0 0 
NL06 0 0 0 0 
UK86 0.75 0.75 0 0.75 
UK95 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
UK99 0.75 0 0 0 
UK04 0 0 0 0 
UK07 0.25 0 0 0 
UK08 0.75 0 0 0 
UK11 0.25 0.25 0.25 0 
UK13 0.25 0.25 0.25 0 
UK14 0.75 0.25 0.25 0 
 
Annex 
Table A1: calibration of outcome SPR 
Fuzzy set 
value 
0 0.25 0.75 1 
Changes The reform must contain at least one of The reform must contain at least one The reform must contain at least one of the following: The reform must contain: 
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that must 
be present  
the following: 
 
• Administrative 
changes such as 
changes to 
regulatory 
bodies  
• Changes to 
benefit 
indexation 
mechanism 
of the following: 
 
• Increase in 
retirement age 
• Increase in 
contribution 
rates 
 
• Change in funding 
principle for first pillar 
• Introduction/expansion 
of a non- mandatory 
private pillar 
 
• Introduction/ 
Elimination of 
a mandatory 
private pillar 
 
To calibrate each case for the outcome of SPR we first look at whether a given reform case 
introduces or eliminates a mandatory private pillar. If it does, then it is given a fuzzy set 
value of 1, although it is sensical to assume that it may be accompanied by other changes like 
increases in retirement age, etc, which are not taking into consideration if the reform features 
the introduction or elimination of a private pillar. If the reform does not introduces/eliminate 
a private pillar, then we consider whether it introduces or expands a non-mandatory private 
pillar or if it changes the funding principle of the first public pillar. If it does, then it receives 
a fuzzy set value of 0.75. If it does not, then we look at whether it features at least one of the 
policy elements listed above to be given a fuzzy set value of 0.25 or 0. 
 
Coding and calibration of causal conditions: 
 
1) Strong labour movement (SL). For this causal condition we use data from Visser (2016) 
on the institutional characteristics of trade unions. We consider two key variables from this 
dataset to build the SL causal condition: union density and wage bargaining coverage. Union 
density measures the net union membership as a proportion of wage and salary earners in 
employment.3 Collective bargaining coverage measures the number of employees covered by 
wage bargaining agreements as a proportion of all wage and salary earners in employment 
                                                     
3 Net union membership is the total union membership minus union members outside the 
active, dependent and employment labour force (i.e., retired workers, independent workers, 
students and unemployed). See Visser (2016, p. 15). 
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with the right to bargaining (Visser 2009, 15). We consider that the overall strength of the 
labor movement depends more on the coverage of the collective wage agreements they can 
sign than on the number of workers affiliated to them, albeit this cannot be totally 
disregarded. This is because the existence of wide-ranging collective agreement will surely 
cover workers who are not members of a trade union. Consistent with this approach we 
weight the raw values of these two variables in the year a reform is adopted in the following 
way:  union density is weighted by 1/3 and collective bargaining coverage is weighted by 2/3. 
The added weighted value is then converted into a five fuzzy set value casual condition. 
 
To calibrate the fuzzy set values we looked at the distribution of the data and identified gaps 
of more than 2 percentage points. These were at 65% at the top of the distribution and at 30% 
at the bottom. Therefore, total values of 65% or more are considered to be "fully in the set" of 
strong labor movements and given a fuzzy set value of 1. Total values of 30% or less are 
"fully out of the set" of strong labor movements and given a fuzzy set value of 0. The 
crossover point is set for a total value of 50%. Total values of more than 30% but less than 
50% are "almost out of the set" and receive a value of 0.25. Total values of more than 50% 
but less than 65 are "almost in the set" and receive a value of 0.75. 
 
2) Significant legislative fragmentation (LF). This causal condition captures the degree of 
fragmentation in a given polity. A significantly fragmented legislature will give place to 
weaker governments than a non fragmented one as a coalition will be necessary to form 
government. As our cases include countries with two chambers, we focus on the chamber that 
wields the majority of power in the law-making process and whose membership is key for the 
formation of Government (i.e., the Commons in the case of the UK, the Deputies Chamber in 
Italy, the Bundestag in Germany and so on). 
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We use the effective number of parties’ seats (number of parties with seats) in the main 
chamber in the year in which the pension reform started to be treated to construct a fuzzy set 
condition of legislative fragmentation.4 This data comes from Gallagher (2017).5 The higher 
the number of effective party seats the higher the fragmentation in a given polity and in its 
government. 
 
Our understanding of significant fragmentation is one in which coalitions are hard to achieve. 
A solid three party system may have a tendency towards a bipartisan logic if the center is 
occupied by a party open to form alliances. A political system with four or more effective 
parties with seats could make such behaviour more difficult given the need to provide 
specific concessions to more than one party (Laakso and Taagepera 1979). Therefore, we 
assume that an effective number of party seats of 4 or more is “fully in the set” of significant 
fragmentation and receives a fuzzy set value of 1. An effective number of parties of 2.5 or 
less is “fully out of the set” of significant fragmentation and it receives a value of 0. An 
effective number of parties of 3 is “neither in nor out” and receives a value of 0.5. An 
effective number of more than 2.5 and less than 3 will be “mostly out of the set” of 
significant fragmentation and receives a fuzzy set value of 0.25. An effective number of more 
than 3 and less than 4 is “almost in the set” and receives a value of 0.75. 
Many scholars (Huber and Ragin 2001; Weyland 2002) have highlighted that unemployment 
rates significantly affect the sustainability of pension systems and thus lead to reforms. 
Furthermore,pension spending represents the most significant outlay in government spending 
(World Bank 1994; Natali 2004). It follows that high unemployment and also a significant 
                                                     
4 More specifically, we took the number corresponding to the last election before a reform 
was introduced as we assume that the government composition is a result of such election 
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government deficit may prompt the need for reform as it will put a significant burden on the 
government to finance the pension system. Our two structural socio-economic causal 
conditions are therefore as follows: 
 
3) Significant unemployment (SU). Any significant increase in unemployment puts pressure 
on the financing of the system. However, we consider that such effect is not immediate as 
time may pass until the situation gets really serious and the government decides to carry out a 
pension reform. Thus, we look at the average unemployment rate of the four quarters before a 
reform is introduced. The sources for these data are World Bank (2017), Eurostat (2017) and 
OECD (2017). 
 
Selecting a cut-off for full membership in the set of high unemployment is context specific. 
The cut-off could be quite different if we were looking at the USA, with its more deregulated 
labour market than continental Europe. To calibrate this outcome we have looked at the 
distribution of the data to see gaps of more than 2%. These have been identified at 12% at the 
top of the distribution and at 6% at the bottom. Therefore, a fuzzy set value of 1 is given to 
cases with an average unemployment rate of 12% or more. Cases with average 
unemployment rates of 6% or less are considered to be "fully out of the set" of significant 
unemployment and thus given a fuzzy set value of 0. The cross-over fuzzy set value of 0.5 is 
set at 9%. Thus cases with unemployment rate values of more than 9% but less than 12% are 
given a fuzzy set value of 0.75 and cases with unemployment rates of more than 6% but less 
than 9% are given a fuzzy set value of 0.25. 
 
4) Significant government deficit (GD). Given that pension payments constitute the single 
most important item of government spending in advanced industrialized countries, we 
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assume that high levels of government budget deficit increase the likelihood of adopting a 
significant reform. As with unemployment, we acknowledge that some time may pass until 
the government decides to address this by proposing a significant pension reform. Thus, we 
consider the value of government budget balance in the year prior to the introduction of a 
pension reform proposal to construct a fuzzy-set causal condition. This data comes from IMF 
(2017). 
 
A fuzzy set value of 1 and thus "fully in the set" of significant government deficit is given to 
cases with deficit values of 7% of GDP and over. Cases with deficits of 3% or less are 
considered to be "fully out of the set" of significant deficit as this equals to the threshold set 
out in the EU Stability and Growth Pact. The 0.5 cross-over value is given to cases with 
deficits of 5% of GDP. Therefore, cases with budget deficits of more than 3% of GDP but 
less than 5% are given a fuzzy set value of 0.25 and cases with deficit values of more than 
5% but less than 7% are given a fuzzy set value of 0.75. 
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Table A2: Fuzzy set values for the outcome and causal conditions 
Country Year Reform content SPR SL LF SU GD 
Greece 1990 Increase in retirement age to 60 
(women) and 65 (men) 
Increase in minimum contribution 
periods 
Tightening eligibility for invalidity 
pension 
Increase in reference period from 2 
to 5 years 
Increase in contribution ceiling 
Pension indexation changed 
Introduction of benefit reductions 
for early retirement 
Re-introduction of contributions for 
public servants  
Abolition of special funds for 
banks, telecommunication, 
electricity and public transport was 
not enacted as originally envisioned 
0.25 1 0 0.25 1 
Greece 1991 Higher retirement age for women 
and women with young children 
Extension of reference period to the 
whole working career 
Changes in the level of invalidity 
pensions 
 
Law 1976/91 
Higher retirement age for women 
and women with young children 
Extension of reference period to the 
whole working career 
Changes in the level of invalidity 
pensions 
Reduction of benefit ceilings 
 
 
0.25 1 0 0.25 1 
Greece 1992 Harmonization of eligibility 
conditions  
Changes in financing: increase in 
contribution rates 
Harmonization of male and female 
retirement ages to 65  
New system for new entrants after 
1.1.1993 
Contribution increase for civil 
servants and self-employed 
Introduction of maximum 
replacement rate of 60% for main 
0.25 1 0 0.25 1 
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Country Year Reform content SPR SL LF SU GD 
pension and 20% for supplementary 
pensions 
 
Greece 1999 Merger of several insurance funds 
for self-employed and in the public 
sector  
Changes in survivors’ pension 
Changes in pension accumulation 
rules 
 
0 1 0 1 0.75 
Greece 2002 Introduction of legislative 
framework for the (voluntary) 
creation of occupational capital-
funded pension insurance managed 
by the social partners 
Harmonization of replacement rate 
to 70% for both private and public 
sector 
Extension of reference period for 
public sector from last salary to best 
5 of last 10 years 
Establishment of the National 
Actuarial Authority and 
introduction of voluntary II pillar 
pensions 
 
0.75 0.75 0 0.75 0.75 
Greece 2008 Merging of primary funds into 5 
and of auxiliary into 8 
IKA (primary pensions)-uniformity 
of rules to all merged funds 
(phased-in) 
Incentives for working longer 
(increment in pensions for those 
working beyond 60, b1993 and 
beyond 65 a.1993) 
Age limit for early retirement 
tightened and (since 2013) 58 years 
for those with 37 years of 
employment 
Increase in retirement age for 
women with long phase-in period 
 
0.25 0.75 0.25 0.25 0.75 
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Country Year Reform content SPR SL LF SU GD 
Greece 2010 Introduction of basic pension 
(quasi-universal) from 2015 
onwards- means-tested for insured 
and those with insufficient 
employment record 
Changes to indexation formula  
Introduction of sustainability factor 
From 2021 adjustment of pension 
retirement age on the basis of life 
expectancy  
Harmonization of retirement age at 
65 for both men and women 
Retirement allowed with the 
completion of 40 years of work, yet 
only if they have reached 60 years 
Early retirement is set at 60 years  
Pension benefit calculated on life-
time earnings (instead of last 5 
years before retirement) 
Replacement rate reduced from 
70% to 34% for 35 years of work  
Rationalization through 
amalgamation of funds 
0.75 0.75 0.25 1 1 
Greece  2011 Introduction of (EKAS) Pensioners' 
Social Solidarity Supplement 
from 1.1.2011: 
Minimum age 60 years 
 
0.25 0.25 0.25 1 1 
Greece 2012 Creation of single supplementary 
fund (ETEA): 
Public law body with administrative 
and financing organization 
Notional defined contribution 
system (NDC) 
Main sources of funding: employer 
and employee contributions 
Minimum years for the award of 
pension: 15 
 
0.75 0.25 1 1 1 
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Italy  1992 (D.lgs. 503/92) 
Retirement age raised from 55 to 60 
(female) and from 60 to 65 (male) 
Benefit calculation formula:  
2 from last 5 (private sector) & last 
month (public sector) to 10 for 
those with at least 15 years of 
contributions Entire working career 
for new entrants 
Indexation mechanism: from wages 
to prices 
Lengthening of minimum 
qualifying period for standard old-
age pension from 15 to 20 years 
Phasing-out of baby pensions for 
public employees for public 
employees 
Harmonization of public sector 
seniority pensions with private 
sector 
Lengthening of minimum 
qualifying period for seniority 
pensions from 35 to 36 years 
Reduction of accrual rates for 
workers with higher wages 
 
D/Lgs 124/93- II  pillar 
Legal framework for open and 
closed pension funds in the II and 
III pillars. 
 
0.75 1 1 0.25 1 
Italy  1995 Change from final salary to 
Notional Defined Contribution). 
Gradual phasing 
Flexible retirement: 57-65 years 
Seniority pensions: gradual increase 
of min qualifying period from 35 to 
40 years 
Increase in contribution rates 
Tax incentives for supplementary 
second pillar pensions 
 
0.75 1 1 0.75 1 
Italy  1997 Indexation mechanism: 1 year 
freeze 
Increase of basic pensions 
Tightening of conditions for 
seniority pensions 
 
0.25 1 1 0.75 0.75 
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Italy  2004 Fixed and higher retirement age in 
the first pillar: 65 for men and 60 
for women  
Introduction of bonus for deferred 
retirement  
Introduction of an extra 3% tax on 
very high pensions 
 
Second Pillar: TfR transfer with the 
‘silent assent’ formula- in the 
default option  
0.75 0.75 1 0.25 0.25 
Italy  2009 Equalisation of female retirement 
age in the public sector from 60 to 
65 by 2018 
Increase in legal retirement age 
(postponed for 2015)- adjusted to 
change sin life expectancy over past 
5 years 
 
0.25 1 0.75 0.25 0 
Italy  2010 Retirement age harmonized 
(male/female-public sector) in 2012 
Introduction of automatic link of 
eligibility conditions to 
demographic trends 
 
0.25 1 0.75 0.25 0.75 
Italy  2011 Abolition of seniority pensions 
Changes to flexible retirement 
Indexation: Temporary freeze for 
2012-2013 for pensions above 1400 
gross/month 
Shortened phasing in of the NDC 
system 
Introduction of minimum 
contribution period for a full 
pension: 20 years 
 
0.75 1 0.75 0.25 0.25 
Hungary 1997 I PILLAR 
Increase (in steps) of retirement age 
for full pension  
Reductions (from 2013 onwards) 
for those choosing to retire before 
full benefit age 
Increase of entry benefits for those 
delaying retirement beyond full 
benefit age 
 
NEW II PILLAR 
Mandatory for new entrants, 
optional for old ones  
1 0.25 0.25 0.5 0.25 
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8% of gross wage to be channelled 
to new pillar 
 
Hungary 2010 Temporary suspension of transfers 
to the second private pillar 
Introduction of right to exit the II 
pillar (those who remained would 
have to pay higher contributions 
and would lose their right to all 
entitlements that will accrue in the I 
pillar after 2011)  
 
0.75 0 0 0.75 0.25 
Hungary 2011 Elimination of II Pillar; 
accumulated funds transferred to 
the social security fund 
1 0 0 0.75 0.75 
Sweden 1992 Changes to indexation mechanism  0 1 1 0 0 
Sweden 1994 Guarantee pension (non-
contributory, tax finance for those 
with low pension entitlements or no 
income) - replaces basic pension 
and pension supplement 
Payable from the age of 65 
Introduction of a Notional Defined 
Contribution system for the first 
pillar 
Retirement age: flexible, benefits 
can be drawn from the age of 61 
Changes to indexation of benefits 
accrued and in payment 
Introduction of a mandartory 
second pillar of individual private 
accounts 
 
1 1 0.75 0.25 1 
Sweden 1998 Increase in contribution rates to 
private second pillar from 2 to 2.5% 
of qualifying wages 
 
0.25 1 0.75 0.25 0 
Sweden 2001 SEK 170 bn transferred from AP 
funds to the State to cover transition 
costs 
0 1 1 0 0.25 
Germany 1997 Changes to the benefit calculation 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.25 
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formula: introduction of 
demographic (life expectancy) 
adjustment factor in pension 
indexation formula (expected to 
result in a reduction of replacement 
rate from 70% to 64% in the long 
run) 
Increase in retirement age for 
disability pensions (from 60 to 63) 
Germany 1999 Abolishment of demographic 
adjustment factor 
Compulsory coverage for marginal 
employment (atypical employment) 
 
0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0 
Germany 2001 Replacement of the current PAYG 
funded system with a dual one 
comprising a) a reformed PAYG 
system and b) a private personal 
pension 
I PILLAR 
Benefit calculation formula: based 
on average gross earnings 
Introduction of contribution rate 
ceilings (20% up to 2020 and 22% 
up to 2030) 
Introduction of means-tested social 
assistance minimum pension 
II PILLAR 
Introduction of voluntary personal 
pensions. 
0.75 0.75 0.75 0.25 0 
Germany 2004 Benefit calculation formula: 
introduction of sustainability factor 
formula  
0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.25 
Germany 2007 Increase in mandatory retirement 
age to 67 from 65 (69 by 2029)  
0.25 0.25 1 0.25 0 
Germany 2009 Suspension of current indexation 
formula as an exchange for not 
reducing pension benefits (as a 
result of the crisis) 
0 0.25 1 0.25 0 
Switzerland 1994 II PILLAR 
Guarantee of individual pension 
savings in case of labour market 
mobility 
No dissolution of pension savings 
for women in case of marriage 
Splitting of savings between 
spouses in case of divorce 
 
0 0.25 1 0 0.25 
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Switzerland 1995 I PILLAR 
Changes in Basic Pension Scheme 
(AHV/AVS) 
Increase in retirement age for 
women from 62 to 64 
Flexible retirement age 
Splitting of contributions and 
pensions between spouses and 
educational pension credits 
0.25 0.25 1 0 0 
Switzerland 2003 I PILLAR 
11th reform of the basic pension 
scheme AHV/AVS (reform failed 
in direct democratic referendum) 
 
 
0.25 0.25 1 0 0 
Switzerland 2010 Changes to occupational pensions. 
This was rejected in a 
referendum so was not 
implemented 
0 0.25 1 0 0 
Netherlands 1987 Improved portability and protection 
of accumulated pension rights in 
occupational pensions 
0 0.75 0.75 0.25 0.25 
Netherlands 1992 Changes to benefit indexation in 
occupational second pillar pensions  
0 0.75 0.75 0 0 
Netherlands 1994 Further change to occupational 
pensions' indexation rules. This led 
to change occupational schemes 
from final salary Defined Benefit 
(DB) to career average DB and to 
conditional Defined Contribution 
schemes (CDC).  
0.75 0.75 0.75 0.25 0 
Netherlands 1997 Increase in upper limit of first pillar 
AOW contribution of 16.5% 
Establishment of AOW reserve 
fund (to help finance future 
pensions) 
 
0 0.75 1 0.25 0 
Netherlands 2002-
4 
Contribution increase in 
occupational pension schemes 
 
0.25 0.75 1 0 0 
Netherlands 2006 New rules on transparency and 
solvency in occupational pensions 
 
0 0.75 1 0 0 
UK 1986 II Pillar 
Introduction of voluntary personal 
pensions but significant tax relief 
Members of occupational pensions 
were allowed to opt-out into a 
personal pension and get a rebate 
0.75 0.75 0 0.75 0 
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paid  
 
UK 1995 I Pillar 
Increase in retirement age for 
women from 2010 with a long 
phase in period 
II Pillar 
Creation of the Occupational 
Pension Regulatory Agency 
(OPRA)  
 
0.25 0.25 0 0.25 1 
UK 1999 II Pillar 
Introduction of a duty on employers 
to offer Group Personal Pensions 
 
0.75 0.25 0 0 0 
UK 2004 II Pillar 
Replaced OPRA for The Pensions 
Regulator.  
Creation of the Pension Protection 
Fund as a compensating fund  
0 0.25 0 0 0.25 
UK 2007 I Pillar 
Reduction in years required to get a 
full state pension 
Change in the indexation of the I 
Pillar State Pension and other 
benefits to earnings 
State pension credits for carers and 
parents 
Increase of retirement age for men 
and women from 65 to 68 from 
2024 
II Pillar 
End of contracting out from state 
second pension for personal 
pensions from 2012 
 
0.25 0.25 0 0 0 
UK 2008 II Pillar 
Introduction of automatic 
enrolment from 2012. Led to an 
increase the number of workers' 
saving into a private pension from 
48% in 2012 to %80 in 2017 
 
0.75 0.25 0 0 0 
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UK 2011 I Pillar 
Accelerates the increase in the state 
pension age for men and women to 
66 from 2020 
 
0.25 0 0.25 0.25 1 
UK 2013 II Pillar 
Change in rules for public service 
pension schemes. 
0.25 0 0.25 0.25 1 
UK 2014 I Pillar 
Simplification of the state pension. 
Significant because the new 
pension is worth over 40% more 
than the old one. 
 
0.75 0 0.25 0.25 0.75 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
